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Ernst Mach and Perspectival Realism

A new article by Pietro Gori has been published in the Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
The paper titled “The Perspectival Realist features of Ernst Mach’s Critical Epistemology has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it explores the extent to which Mach was inspired by Kant’s approach to philosophical inquiry and tried to further elaborate it through his historico-critical method for enlightening scientific knowledge claims. On the other hand, it argues that the focus on the situated character of these claims that is implied in Mach’s epistemology makes it possible to compare his view to recent attempts to defend a perspectival realist account of scientific knowledge, thus revealing the relevance of Mach’s own approach as a methodology in the philosophy of science.
Full-text access to a view-only version of the paper is available here, as part of the Springer Nature Content Sharing Initiative.
 
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CFP – Pragmatism and/on Science and Scientism

The European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy encourages authors to submit a paper for the Special Issue on Pragmatism and/on Science and Scientism, organized by Rachel Christy and Pietro Gori.
The history of the encounter between pragmatism and science is long, fruitful, yet also problematic. Each of the major founding pragmatists (Peirce, James, Dewey) was at some time during their career directly engaged with experimental science. All three wrote about the nature of scientific inquiry and the status of scientific theories, and reflected on how the methods of the sciences can be related with other methods of fixing belief. Moreover, pragmatist attitudes can be encountered in major figures of both the history and the philosophy of science (e.g. Quine, Kuhn, Putnam, Laudan, and Kitcher), who engaged critically with the issue of the value of knowledge claims. Finally, pragmatism walks hand in hand with naturalism, given the interest of classic pragmatists such as Peirce, James, and Wright (among others) in demanding natural, as opposed to supernatural, answers to our philosophical questions.
Despite – or parallel to – this general interest in the scientific theoretical framework, pragmatist thinkers almost always rejected scientism, understood as an attitude of science-worship involving an uncritical faith in the methods of the modern sciences, an uncritical acceptance of their assumptions and conclusions, and a quasi-religious faith in the overriding value of the scientific enterprise. Contrary to this view, for example, pragmatists such as James and Dewey argued that science can neither tell us what we should value, nor fully account for the value we in fact find in certain objects, activities, and experiences. And crucially, they maintained that science cannot tell us whether or why its own goal of attaining truth is valuable. Broadly speaking, it is possible to say that pragmatism challenges scientism, protecting the original nature of lived experience from rationalism and scientific materialism; taking ideas as essentially connected with voluntary action; and regarding faith as necessary for any practical achievement of truth.
In line with this, the proposed issue of the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy aims to explore to what extent the encounter of pragmatism and science can offer the opportunity to reflect upon the genesis and nature, limits and potentialities of both philosophical and scientific inquiry, with a special focus on the problem as to how science and common sense, science and philosophy, science and religion – broadly, science and culture – fit together, and to what extent science can be a reference for human praxis.
Authors are encouraged to submit papers on topics such as (but not limited to) the influence of science upon philosophy; the role of the scientific method in the fixing of beliefs; science as a form of life; the place of science in individual and/or social life; pragmatist approaches to the debate on naturalism; and historical and contemporary pragmatist attitudes in the philosophy of science.
Papers in English should be sent to Rachel Cristy (rachel.cristy[at]kcl.ac.uk) and Pietro Gori (pgori[at]fcsh.unl.pt) by December 2023. Prepared for a process of blind review, they should not exceed 8 000 words and must include an abstract of 200 words and a list of references.
The selected papers will be published in April 2024.
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MA Scholarship in Philosophy of Science

It is now open the tender for the award of 1 Scholarship for MA students. The succesful candidate will join the team of the research project ‘Mary B. Hesse’s ‘New Epistemology’. Principles and Legacy’ financed by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology, and hosted by IFILNOVA.
The fellow researcher will work on issues related to the problem of scientific knowledge, with a focus on scientific modelling. Also, s/he will translate into Portuguese a selection of texts by Mary B. Hesse and other authors of the post-empiricist tradition that will be published by a national publisher. Finally, the fellow researcher is expected to help in the organization of talks, conferences and seminars, participate in the project meetings and in related events organized by IFILNOVA’s Laboratory of Culture and Values, which hosts the project.
The fellow will work under the scientific orientation of Pietro Gori.
The relevant information is provided here

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Special Issue

Steven French edited a special virtual issue of The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science which collects papers by and on Mary Hesse.
The issue appeared in 2017 and can be consulted here.
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Mach and Hesse

In 2021, Pietro Gori published an article on “Ernst Mach’s Contribution to the Philosophy of Science in Light of Mary B. Hesse’s Postempiricism” in the The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science (HOPOS).
The paper explores how Mach conceived of the relationship between facts and theories, and approaches this issue in light of Mary B. Hesse’s view of a postempiricist account of natural science. As show by Gori, this view is characterized by a constructivist conception of the relationship between theory and facts that seems to be consistent with Mach’s observations on scientific knowledge.
The paper first explores Hesse’s account of postempiricism and her project of a new epistemology. It then considers Ernst Mach’s conception of facts as the middle term of a triad of concepts that includes thoughts and elements as extreme terms. Finally, the paper will offer concluding remarks on Mach’s contribution to the debate on scientific realism and his attempt to redefine the notions of correspondence and objectivity in science.